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Statement of Questions fo^ Review 
The Court of Appeals found that the "drawee's refusal 
to pay" element of Section 76-6-505(1) (1^83) of the Utah Code is 
alone sufficient to give the State proper jurisdiction to 
prosecute an offender of the bad check statute where the draweefs 
conduct occurs within the State. Is this decision not error when 
considered in light of Section 76-1-201 (1973) of the Utah Code 
which provides that a person is subject to prosecution in this 
state for an offense which he commits by his own conduct or that 
of another for whom he is legally accountable where either some 
proscribed conduct of his or of his servant which is an element 
of the offense or some proscribed result of that conduct which 
result i£ an element of the offense occurs within the state, 
since the conduct of the drawee is not proscribed conduct nor is 
it the proscribed result of the offend-ing conduct. 
Reference to Opinion B^low 
State of Utah vs. Patrick Dean Cpando, Case No. 
880548-CA, Opinion of the Utah Court of Appeals filed December 
15, 1989. 
Jurisdiction 
Jurisdiction of the Supreme Court is invoked on these 
grounds. 
A. The above named decision of the Utah Court of 
Appeals was entered December 15, 1989. 
B. Rule 43(4) of the Rules of t*>e Utah Supreme Court 
confers jurisdiction on the Supreme Court tto review decisions of 
1 
the Court of Appeals when the Court of Appeals has decided an 
important question of State law which has not been, but should 
be, settled by the Supreme Court. 
UCA 78-2-2(3)(a) confers appellate jurisdiction on 
the Supreme Court over a judgment of the Court of Appeals; and 
78-2-2(5) gives the court sole discretion to grant 
or deny a writ of certiorari; and 
78-2-2(2) gives the Supreme Court jurisdiction to 
issue all writs and process necessary to effect its orders. 
Controlling Statutory and Constitutional Authorities 
The due process and equal protection requirement of 
Article 1, Section 7 Utah Constitution, and the Fifth and 
Fourteenth Amendments to the U.S. Constitution. 
Section 76-6-505 of the Utah Code. (Copies in appen-
dix. ) 
Section 76-1-201 of the Utah Code. (Copies in appen-
dix. ) 
Statement of the Case 
Petitioner (Appellant/Defendant below) appealed his 
conviction of issuing bad checks, a third degree felony, in 
violation of Utah Code Ann., Section 76-6-505 (1983) (as 
amended), claiming that the State lacked jurisdiction. 
On October 26, 1987, Defendant was charged in 
Roosevelt, Duchesne County, Utah, with the crime of issuing bad 
checks. The bad checks which Defendant was charged for writing 
included a check for $165.00 to Safeway, checks for $29.26 and 
2 
$20.00 to Tri-Mart, checks for $50.00 and $20.00 to Triangle Oil, 
and checks for $50.00 and $20.00 to Vernal Drug, for a total of 
$324.36.1 Safeway, Tri-Mart and Triangle Oil are in Roosevelt.2 
Vernal Drug and the Vernal branch of First Interstate Bank of 
Utah (First Interstate), the drawee of each bad check, are in 
Vernal, Uintah County outside the boundary of the Uintah Reserva-
tion.3 
Defendant pleaded guilty to the charges and entered 
into an abeyance agreement, which required him to make restitu-
tion payments and refrain from similar legal violations.4 On 
April 25, 1988, the District Court in Duchesne County, having 
found that Defendant had violated the abeyance agreement, set 
aside the plea in abeyance and entered judgment on the guilty 
plea.5 Defendant moved to dismiss for lack of jurisdiction at an 
order to show cause hearing, on grounds that he was a Uintah 
Indian of the Uintah and Wind River Reservations and that the 
offenses were committed on the Uintah and Ouray Reservation. The 
court denied Defendant's motion, finding that he was not an 
enrolled member of the Uintah and Ouray Reservations and that all 
the checks issued by Defendant were drawn on First Interstate 
Bank of Utah, Vernal branch, which is not within an Indian 
reservation.6 
IRecord p. 2 
2Record pp. 4, 29, 30 
^Record pp. 140, 141 
^Record pp. 39, 44 
5Record p. 61 
6Record p. 146-7 
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On appeal, Defendant claimed that the State lacks 
jurisdiction because he is an Indian and all but two of the bad 
checks were passed in Roosevelt, which is in Indian country and 
not subject to State jurisdiction. See Ute Indian Tribe v. State 
of Utah, 521 F. Supp. 1072, 1188 (D. Utah 1981), afffd in part, 
rev!d in part, 716 F.2d 1298 (10th Cir. 1983), reh'g 773 F.2d 
1087 (10th Cir. 1985), cert, denied, 108 S. Ct. 596 (1986). 
Defendant asserted that even if the information were valid 
regarding the Vernal checks that the State would have had 
jurisdiction to prosecute for the two checks totalling $70.00 
written to Vernal Drug, in Uintah County only. He contends, as a 
result, that the State may then have charged him with a class B 
misdemeanor only, and not a third degree felony because the 
amount involved is less than $200.00. See Utah Code Ann. Section 
76-6-505(3)(a) (1983). 
The State argued that notwithstanding the Ute Indian 
Tribe decision, Roosevelt is not in Indian country and further, 
that Defendant did not sufficiently establish his membership in 
an Indian tribe. In addition, the State argued that payment by 
the drawee bank is an essential element of the bad check offense 
thus giving the State jurisdiction over all offenses involving 
checks drawn on banks located within the State and undisputedly 
not within Indian country. The Court of Appeals held that the 
drawee's refusal to pay is an essential element of the bad check 
statute, and because that element occurred within the State the 
State had jurisdiction to prosecute Defendant for all bad checks 
4 
written on First Interstate Bank and affirmed his conviction. 
(See decision of the Utah Court of Appeals, No. 880546-CA, 
December 15, 1989 in appendix.) 
Argument for the Issuance of a Writ 
The opinion of the Court of Appeals allows the State to 
exercise criminal jurisdiction beyond the scope of Section 
76-1-201 (1973) of the Utah Code which determines the scope of 
State jurisdiction over offenses and results in a violation of 
Due Process and Equal Protection. The aforementioned statute 
provides in pertinent part as follows: 
(1) A person is subject to prosecution in 
this state for an offense which he commits, 
while either within or outside the state, by 
his own conduct or that of another for which 
he is legally accountable, if (a) the offense 
is committed either wholly or partly within 
the state. 
(2) An offense is committed partly within 
this state if either the conduct which is an 
element of the offense, or the result which 
is such an element occurs within this state. 
Under this section if conduct or a result of conduct 
constituting an element of the offense occurs within this state, 
the state has jurisdiction to prosecute the offense. 
Utah Code Ann. 76-6-505(1) (1983) defines the elements 
of the crime of issuing a bad check as follows: 
Any person who issues or passes a check or 
draft for the payment of money, for the pur-
pose of obtaining from any person, firm, 
partnership, or corporation, any money, pro-
perty, or other thing of value or paying for 
any services, wages, salary, labor, or rent, 
knowing it will not be not be paid by the 
drawee and payment is refused by the drawee, 
is guilty of issuing a bad check or draft. 
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The Court held that the drawee's refusal to pay is an 
essential element of the bad check statute. The Court may be 
correct in asserting that the element is essential to the 
ripening of a prosecutable offense, but it errs in asserting that 
the occurrence of said element alone within the state without 
some causal connection with the offenders conduct is sufficient 
to confer jurisdiction on the Court. 
The drawee's refusal to pay is clearly not conduct of 
the offender who issues the check, nor is it the conduct of 
another for which the issuer is legally accountable. The drawee 
bank is a third party with discretion to pay or not to pay, 
People v. Quinn 549 P.2d 1332, 1335 (Colorado, 1976). The 
drawee's discretionary act is not the act of a servant in the 
service of his master, but is instead the act of an independent 
contractor who contracts with another to do something for him, 
but who is not controlled by the other nor subject to the others 
right to control with respect to his physical conduct in the 
performance of the undertaking. The drawer does not cause the 
drawee to refuse payment. 
The only remaining manner in which the drawee's refusal 
to pay could be considered a jurisdictional element of the 
offense is if it were a proscribed result of conduct constituting 
an element of the offense. The drawee's discretionary refusal to 
pay is not the necessary natural result or outcome of any conduct 
of the drawer, it is more like an attendant circumstance which 
must occur in order for the offense to ripen for prosecution. 
6 
For example, in murder the defendant's conduct must produce a 
death. The death is a proscribed element of the crime which has 
resulted from the conduct of the offender. This proscribed 
result has a causal nexus with the offensive conduct of the 
offender. Defendant's conduct caused the death. It is obvious 
that a blow to the head may naturally produce a certain result 
which is death. Section 76-1-201(2) (197$) of the Utah Code 
indicates that this is the type of result contemplated in para-
graph 1 of the same Section. That is to say a result which is 
the natural result of or which is caused by the defendant's 
conduct. At first glance, it may appear that when an offender 
issues a check knowing that it will not be paid on presentment in 
exchange for something of value he causes the drawee to refuse 
payment, however, if the drawee's conduct in refusing to pay is 
discretionary, that is of his own volitioiji then it lacks a causal 
nexus with the offender's conduct which occurred in a different 
place and at a different time. The drawee's refusal to pay is 
not conduct proscribed by law nor is it a proscribed result of 
said conduct, it is better viewed as a circumstance which must 
occur in connection with some proscribed Conduct,(i.e. issuing a 
bad check) or some proscribed result, (i.e. defrauding someone of 
something of value), in which case the drawee's discretionary 
refusal to pay is a circumstance which must occur in conjunction 
with the offender's conduct, (i.e. issuing the check knowing that 
it will not be paid) or in conjunction with the result of his 
conduct, (i.e. defrauding another of something of value) which 
conduct or result must occur within the state's jurisdiction. A 
court has no power to exert jurisdiction beyond the scope of 
statutory provisions for jurisdiction and therefore, in this case 
the Court of Appeals should have considered the other issues not 
reached by it because it determined that the draweefs discretion-
ary refusal to pay was by itself a sufficient jurisdictional 
element rather than a circumstantial element necessary for the 
ripening of a prosecutable offense. State v. Laud 654 P.2d 1223 
(Wyoming, 1982). It is the latter construction which would 
better give effect to all of the provisions of the bad check 
statute and is therefore the favored construction. Pate v. 
Marathon Steel Company 777 P.2d 428, 430 (Utah, 1989). 
Since due process can only flow from a court with 
proper jurisdiction, a conviction obtained without proper juris-
diction is by implication a deprivation of liberty without due 
process of law in violation of the Constitutions of Utah and of 
the United States; and to base jurisdiction on conduct or results 
of conduct beyond the control of an alleged offender would 
violate Due Process and Equal Protection and result in injustice. 
Conclusion 
A writ of certiorari should be granted for review of 
the above mentioned opinion of the Utah Court of Appeals to 
prevent any injustice arising therefrom and to clarify the 
ambiguity raised by the conclusion that the "drawee's refusal to 
pay" is an essential element of the bad check offense. 
8 
Dated this day of January, 1990 
Dixon D. Hindley 
Attorney for Petitioner 
I hereby certify on this day of January, 1990, a true 
and correct copy of the forgoing petition for a writ of certiorari 
was mailed, postage prepaid, first class, U. S. Mail to: R. Paul 
Van Dam, Attorney General, Sandra L. Sjogren, Assistant Attorney 
General, 236 State Capitol, Salt Lake City, Utah 84114. 
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Patrick Dean Coando, 
Defendant and Appellant. 
__jfi#rkoff» Court 
Eighth D i s t r i c t / Duchesne County umOun*Aj*aafc 
The Honorable Dennis L. Draney 
Attorneys: Dixon D. Hindley# Salt Lake City# for Appellant 
R. Paul Van Dam and Sandra Sjogren/ Salt Lake 
City, for Respondent 
OPINION 
(For Publication) 
Case No. 880546-CA 
F I L E D 
DEC 151989 
Before Judges Bench/ Greenwood/ and Croft.^ 
GREENWOOD/ Judge: 
Defendant Patrick Dean Coando appeals his conviction of 
issuing bad checks/ a third degree felony, in violation of Utah 
Code Ann. § 76-6-505 (Supp. 1989). Defendant urges reversal of 
his conviction/ claiming that the State lacks jurisdiction. We 
affirm. 
On October 26/ 1987, defendant was charged in Roosevelt/ 
Duchesne County/ Utah/ with the crime of issuing bad checks. The 
bad checks which defendant was charged included a check for $165 
to Safeway/ checks for $29.26 and $20 to Tri-Mart/ checks for $50 
and $20 to Triangle Oil/ and checks for $50 and $20 to Vernal 
Drug/ for a total of $354.26. Safeway# Tri-Mart# and Triangle 
Oil are in Roosevelt. Vernal Drug and the Vernal branch of First 
Interstate Bank of Utah (First Interstate)/ the drawee of each 
bad check/ are in Vernal/ Uintah County. 
1. Bryant H. Croft/ Senior District Judge, sitting by special 
appointment pursuant to Utah Code Ann. § 78-3-24(10) (Supp. 
1989). 
Defendant pleaded guilty to the charges and entered into an 
abeyance agreement, which required him to make restitution 
payments and refrain from similar legal violations. On April 25, 
1988, the district court in Duchesne County, having found that 
defendant had violated the abeyance agreement, set aside the plea 
in abeyance and entered judgment on the guilty plea. Defendant 
moved to dismiss for lack of jurisdiction at an order to show 
cause hearing, on grounds that he was an enrolled tribal member 
of the Uintah and Wind River Reservations and that the offenses 
were committed on the Uintah-Ouray Reservations. The court 
denied defendant's motion, finding that he was not an enrolled 
member of the Uintah and Ouray Reservations and that all the 
checks issued by defendant were drawn on First Interstate Bank of 
Utah, Vernal branch, which is not within an Indian reservation. 
On appeal, defendant claims that the State lacks 
jurisdiction because he is an Indian and all but two of the bad 
checks were passed in Roosevelt, which is in Indian country and 
not subject to state jurisdiction. See Ute Indian Tribe v. State 
of Utah, 521 F. Supp. 1072, 1188 (D. Utah 1981), aff'd in part, 
rev'd in part, 716 F.2d 1298 (10th Cir. 1983), reh'g 773 F.2d 
1087 (10th Cir. 1985), cert, denied, 107 S. Ct. 596 (1986). 
Defendant concedes that the State has jurisdiction to prosecute 
for the two checks totaling $70 written to Vernal Drug, in Uintah 
County. He contends, as a result, that the State may charge him 
with a class B misdemeanor only, and not a third degree felony 
because the amount involved is less than $200. See Utah Code 
Ann. § 76-6-505(3)(a) (Supp. 1989). 
The State argues that notwithstanding the Ute Indian Tribe 
decision, Roosevelt is not in Indian country and further, that 
defendant did not sufficiently establish his membership in an 
Indian tribe. In addition, the State argues that payment by the 
drawee bank is an essential element of the bad check offense thus 
giving the State jurisdiction over all offenses involving checks 
drawn on banks located within the state and undisputedly not 
within Indian country. We address this second argument first, 
and find it dispositive. 
ESSENTIAL ELEMENT 
The State argues that First Interstate1s refusing payment of 
the checks defendant issued is an essential element of the bad 
check offense and because the refusal occurred outside Indian 
country, the State may assert proper jurisdiction over all the 
bad check charges arising from checks drawn on First Interstate. 
We agree. Utah Code Ann. § 76-1-201 (1978) states in pertinent 
part: 
880546-CA 2 
(1) A person is subject to ptosecution 
in this state for an offense which he 
commits, while either within or outside 
the state, by his own conduct or that of 
another for which he is legally 
accountable/ if: j 
(a) the offense is committed either 
wholly or partly within the state; 
(2) An offense is committed partly 
within this state if either the conduct 
which is an element of the offepse, or the 
result which is such an element, occurs 
within this state. I 
Under section 76-1-201, if conduct or a result of conduct 
constituting any element of the offense occurs within the state, 
the State has jurisdiction to prosecute the offense. 
Utah Code Ann. § 76-6-505(1) (Supp. 1989) defines the 
elements of the crime of issuing a bad check or draft as follows 
Any person who issues or passejs a check 
or draft for the payment of money, for the 
purpose of obtaining from any person, 
firm, partnership, or corporation, any 
money, property, or other thing of value 
or paying for any services, wage$, salary, 
labor, or rent, knowing it will not be 
paid by the drawee and payment i$ refused 
by the drawee, is guilty of issuing a bad 
check or draft. 
(Emphasis added.)2 
2. Prior to enactment of section 76-6-505 in 1973, passing 
checks without sufficient funds was governed by Utah Code Ann. 
§ 76-20-11 (1953). Under section 76-20-11, refusal of payment 
was not an element of the crime, but instead served only as 
admissible proof of presentment and presumptive evidence of 
insufficiency of funds. 
When construing statutory language, we assume that all words 
and terms are used advisedly and interpret terms in accordance 
with their commonly accepted meaning. Pate v. Marathon Steel 
Co., 777 P.2d 428, 430 (Utah 1989); Hector Inc. v. United Sav. & 
Loan Ass'n, 741 P.2d 542, 546 (Utah 1987); Grant v. Utah State 
Land Bd., 26 Utah 2d 100, 485 P.2d 1035, 1036 (1971); Gleave v. 
Denver & Rio Grande W. R.R. Co., 749 P.2d 660, 672 (Utah Ct. App. 
1988). The language of section 76-6-505 unambiguously provides 
that the drawee's refusal to pay is an essential element of the 
offense since the provision is written in the conjunctive and 
requires refusal of payment for the offense to be complete. The 
Colorado Supreme Court considered similar language in Colorado's 
former bad check statute and found that refusal to pay was an 
element of the crime. People v. Ouinn, 190 Colo. 534, 549 P.2d 
1332, 1334-35 (Colo. 1976) (en banc).3 See also State v. 
Green, 672 P.2d 400, 403 (Utah 1983) (Hall, C.J., dissenting) 
(the essential elements of the bad check offense include refusal 
of payment by the drawee). If the drawee bank does not refuse to 
pay, the crime has not been committed. See Rioas v. State, 34 
Md. App. 324, 367 A.2d 22, 26 (1976) (relying on the principle 
that every element of a crime must be proved, the court reversed 
judgment where the State did not establish that the statutorily 
required element that the same check which defendant used to 
obtain money be dishonored upon presentment). 
Defendant argues that refusal by the drawee to pay is merely 
a condition confirming that the offender had the requisite 
culpable intent4 or knowledge when he issued the check and not 
an essential element of the crime. Defendant claims that the 
3. In Quinn and in People v. Vinnola, 177 Colo. 405, 494 P.2d 
826, 831 (Colo. 1972) (en banc), the Colorado court found that 
the provision of Colorado's bad check statute which required 
dishonor by the drawee bank violated constitutional due process 
and equal protection of the laws because it allowed a third 
party complete discretion to determine criminal liability by 
either paying or dishonoring checks. Defendant has not 
challenged the constitutionality of the Utah statute either at 
trial or on appeal. We, therefore, will not address the issue 
sua sponte. See 16 C.J.S. Constitutional Law § 92 (1984); cf. 
State in Re N.H.B., 777 P.2d 487 (Utah Ct. App. 1989) (a court 
will consider a constitutional issue raised for the first time 
on appeal if a liberty interest is at stake). 
4. Intent to defraud is not a necessary element of the bad 
check offense under section 76-5-505 as now written. State v. 
Delmotte, 665 P.2d 1314, 1315 (Utah 1983). 
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statute is a codification of common law fraud and, consequently, 
since the corpus delicti of the offense is the conduct of passing 
the check for value with the intent to defraud, the essential 
elements of the crime are restricted to the mens rea and actus 
reus of the perpetrator. We note, however, that Utah Code Ann. 
§ 76-1-105 (1978) provides that "Common law crimes are abolished 
and no conduct is a crime unless made so by this code, other 
applicable statute or ordinance." In essence, defendant asks the 
court to limit the dishonor requirement to a statutorily 
established presumption or prima facie case. Some jurisdictions 
have done so, but their statutory language is clearly different 
than Utah's. See e.g., Tolbert v. State. 294 Ala. 738, 321 So.2d 
227, 230-31 (Ala. 1975); State v. Haremza. 515 P.2d 1217, 1224 
(Kan. 1973). Further, defendant offers no support for his 
contention that the essential elements of the offense are limited 
to the mens rea or actus reus of the perpetrator or his assertion 
that the statute is merely a codification of common law fraud. 
In determining the essential elements of the bad check offense, 
we must follow section 76-6-505's unambiguous language rather 
than the requisites of common law fraud. We, therefore, hold 
that because the drawee's refusing payment is an essential 
element of the crime of issuing a bad check and that element 
occurred in this case within the state, the State had proper 
jurisdiction to prosecute defendant for all bad checks written on 
First Interstate. j 
Our holding precludes the necessity of determining whether 
Roosevelt, Utah, is part of federally recognized Indian country, 
and whether defendant sufficiently established his membership in 
an Indian tribe. 
~jp 
Pamela T. Greenwood, Judge 
WE,CONCUR: 
Russe l l W. Bench, Judge 
Btffy&nt H. Croft , Judge/ / 
764-506. 
» 764-505. 
and my other symbols of 
velae, right, prtrikge, or kk^ficatkKi. ' 
<D Forgery is* Moot of toe vecond degree tf the 
%ftt^feor^ar)kmt#*e: « * * .. 
(i) A security, revenue ttamp, or any other 
or writing issued by a gwumuem, or 
r thereof; or 
* f» A check with a tee namat'df f 10* or 
note, an issue of stocks, bonds, or any ether inst-
Tnaat ar writing representor «a sntereat la or 
cista aguiaut property, or a peewanuy sntereet in or 
claim against any person or enterprise. * * ** 
44) Foraery is a felony of the third degree If the 
writing is or parports to be a check with a free 
amount of Jess than $100; afl other forgery is a etas 
A fsusoesneanoT. tfis 
7IW-502. FsastssJaa of forged writing Or device 
far writing. 
Any person who, with intent to defraud, knowi-
ngly possesses any writing that is a forgery as 
defined in section 76-6-501, or who with intent to 
defraud knowingly possesses any device for making 
any such writing, is guilty of a felony of the third 
degree, except where the altering, mating, comple-
tion, execution, issuance, transfer, pebficetk»Vor 
utterance trf such writing would constitute a dast A 
misdemeanor, ia which .event the possession of the 
writing or device for making such a writing shall 
constitutes class A misdemeanor. tfu 
76-6-503. Fraadaleat baaAiag of recordable 
wrttiags. 
(1) Any person who with intent to deceive or 
injure anyone falsifies, destroys, removes, or conc-
eals any will, deed, mortgage, security instrument, 
or other writing for which the law provides public 
recording is guilty of fraudulent handling of recor-
dable writings. 
(2) Fraudulent handling of recordable writings is a 
felony of the third degree. 1*73 
764-504. Tampering with records. 
(1) Any person who, having no privilege to do so, 
knowingly falsifies, destroys, removes, or conceals 
any writing, other than the writings enumerated in 
section 764-503 , or record, public or private, 
with intent to deceive or injure any person or to 
conceal any wrongdoing is guilty of tampering with 
records. 
(2) Tampering with records is a d a i s B misdeme-
anor, urn 
764-505 . lassdng a bad check or draft -
(1) Any person who issues or passes a check or 
draft for the payment of money, for the purpose of 
obtaining from any person, firm, partnership, or 
corporation, any money, property, or other thing of 
value or paying for any services, wages, salary, 
labor, or rent, knowing it will not be paid by the 
drawee and payment is refused by the drawee, is 
guilty of issuing a bad check or draft. 
. For purposes of this subsection, a person who 
issues a check or draft for which payment is refused 
by the drawee is presumed to know the check or 
draft would not be paid if he had no account with 
the drawee at the time of issue. 
(2) Any person who issues or passes a check or 
draft for the payment of money, for the purpose of 
obtaining from any person, firm, partnership, or 
corporation, any money, property, or other thing of 
value or paying for any services, wages, salary, 
labor, or rent, payment o f which check or draft is 
legally refused by the drawee, is guilty o f issuing a 
bad check or draft if he fails to make good and 
actual payment to the payee in the amount o f the 
refused check or draft within 14 days of his recei-
ving actual notice of the check or draft's nonpay-
ment. 
(3) An offense of issuing a bad check or draft 
shall be punished as follows: 
' (a) If the check or draft or series of checks or 
drafts made or drawn in this state within a period 
not exceeding six months amounts to a sum of not 
more than $200, such offense shall be a class B 
misdemeanor. 
(b) If the check or draft or checks or drafts 
made or drawn in this state within a period not 
exceeding six months amounts to a sum exceeding 
$200 but not more than $300, such offense shall be 
a class A misdemeanor. 
(c) If the check or draft or checks or drafts 
made or drawn in this state within a period not 
exceeding six months amounts to a sum exceeding 
$300 but not more than $1,000, such offense shall 
be a felony of the third degree. 
(d) If the check or draft or checks or drafts 
made or drawn in this state within a period not 
exceeding six months amounts to a sum exceeding 
$1,000, such offense shall be a second degree felony. 
764-506 . Flaandal tnutsactkm card offenses -
Definitions. 
For purposes of this part: 
(1) "Automated banking device* means any 
machine which, when properly activated by a fina-
ncial transaction card or a personal identification 
code, may be used for any of the purposes for 
which a financial transaction card may be used. 
(2) "Card holder* means any person or organiz-
ation named on the face of a financial transaction 
card to whom or for whose benefit a financial tra-
nsaction card is issued by an issuer. 
(3) "Financial transaction card" means: 
(a) Any credit card, credit plate, bank services 
card, banking card, check guarantee card, debit 
card, telephone -eredat card, or aaw other card, 
isaned hat mJatoei for the use of tint ew& balder aa 
of value on credit, or at certifying or 
to a parson or beaimris the avaisthiMry to she aard 
holder of the funds on deposit that are eaual to or 
greater than the amount necessary to honor a draft 
or check payable to the order of the person or bus-
iness; or 
(b) Any instrument or device used in providing 
the card holder access to a demand or 
account for the. purpose of snaking deposits of 
orehacks ha the , , ^ 
hi aha teajTof aaoawyrl 
<*> 'I 
rfeaajsmtfcatj 
(5) •Personal WaarifVatkwt node* 
to a card 
ltO 
AH CODE 
n-im Criminal Code 
(2) Define adequately the conduct and mental 
ite which constitute each offense and safeguard 
oduct that is without fault from condemnation as 
mini). 
3) Prescribe penalties which are proportionate to 
> seriousness of offenses and which permit rcco-
itkm or differences in rehabilitation possibilities 
ong individual offenders. 
4) Prevent arbitrary or oppressive treatment of 
sons accused or convicted of offenses. wn 
1-105. CoauBoa law crimes abolished. 
Common law crimes are abolished and no 
tduct Is a crime unless made so by this code, 
er applicable statute or ordinance. m* 
1-100. Strict constracOoa rate not applicable. 
lie rule that a penal statute is to be strictly con-
ted shall not apply to this code, any of its prov-
ns, or any offense defined by the laws of this 
e. All provisions of this code and offenses 
ned by the laws of this state shall be construed 
>rding to the fair import of their terms to 
note justice and to effect the objects of the law 
general purposes of section 76-1-104. tfn 
•107. Procedure • Applicable provisions • 
DHtary codes, enforcement of court orders, and 
ibility for civil damages not affected. 
) Except as otherwise provided, the procedure 
suing the accusation, prosecution, conviction, 
punishment of offenders and offenses is not 
lated by this act but by the code of criminal 
edure. 
) This code does not affect any power conferred 
aw upon any court-martial or other military 
ority or officer to impose and inflict punish-
t upon offenders violating military codes or 
; nor does it affect any power of a court to 
in for contempt or to employ any sanction 
orized by law for the enforcement of an order 
dvfl judgment or decree. 
This act does not bar, suspend, or otherwise 
t any right or liability to damages, penalty, 
iture. Impeachment, or other remedy author-
by law to be recovered or enforced in a dvfl 
n,' administrative proceccXng, or otherwise, 
dless of whether the conduct involved in the 
•ding" constitutes an offense defined In this 
* '* ~ ^ tm 
lot* Stpsriblnfy clause. 
my provision of this act, or the application of 
revision to any person or circumstance, is held 
d, the remainder of this act shall not be affe-
bereby. tm 
rjnrifdktion and Venue 
n. ****** *i 
ILVt*s*efi 
01. Jurisdiction of off* 
t person is subject to prosecution in this state 
offense which he commits, while either within 
tide the state, by his own conduct or that of 
r for which he k legally accountable, if: 
) The offense is committed either wholly or 
vithin the state; or , ^ >
 w 
\ The conduct outside the state constitutes an 
t to commit an offense within the state; or 
The conduct outside the state constitutes a 
acy to commit an offense within the state 
act In furtherance o^the conspiracy occurs 
(d) The conduct within the state < 
attempt, solicitation, or conspiracy to 
another jurisdiction an offense under the lai 
both this state and such other jurisdiction. 
(2) An offense is committed partly wkhin this 
state if either the conduct which is an element of the 
offense, or the result which is such an element, 
occurs within this stale. In homicide the 'result* is 
either the physical contact which causes death, or 
the death itself; and if the body of a homicide 
victim is found within the state, the death shall be 
presumed to have occurred within the state. 
(3) An offense which is based on an omission to 
perform a duty imposed by the law of this state is 
committed within the state regardless of the location 
of the offender at the time of the omission. m 
Tt-1.202. Venae of actions. 
(1) Criminal actions shall be tried in the county or 
district where the offense is alleged to have been 
committed. In determining the proper place of trial, 
the following provisions shall apply: 
(a) If the commission of an offense commenced 
outside the state is consummated within this state, 
the offender shall be tried in the county where the 
offense is consummated. 
(b) When conduct constituting elements Of an 
offense or results that constitute elements, whether 
the conduct or result constituting elements is, in 
itself, unlawful, shall occur in two or more counties, 
trial of the offense may be held in any of the cou-
nties concerned. I 
(c) If a person committing an offense upon the 
person of another is located in one county and his 
victim is located in another county at the time of the 
commission of the offense, trial may be held in 
either county. | 
(d) If a cause of death is inflicted in one county 
and death ensues in another county, the offender 
may be tried in either county. I 
(e) A person who commits an Incohate offense 
may be tried in any county in Vhich any act thai is 
an element of the offense, including the agreement 
in conspiracy, is committed. r *'1 y \ ' 
(0 Where a person in one cqunty solicits, aids, 
abets, agrees, or attempts to aid another m the 
planning or commission of an offense in another 
county, he may be tried for the offense in either 
county. " ' 
(g) When an offense Is committed within wis 
state and it cannot be readily determined in which 
county or district the offense occurred, the follo-
wing provisions shaD be applicable: 
0) When an offense is committed upon any 
railroad car, vehicle, watercraft, or aircraft passing 
within this state, the offender may be tried in any 
county through which such railroad 
watercraft, or aircraft lias passed. 
(2) When an offense Is committed on 
body of water bordering on or within this state;! 
offender may be tried in any county adjacent | 
such body of water. The words 'body of 
shall include but not be limited to any stream, i 
lake, cr reservoir, whether natural wnian-madc. i 
(hi) A person who commits theft may be tried 
in any county in which he exerts control over the 
property affected. 
1
 0v) If an offense is committed on or near I 
boundary of two or more counties, trial of 
offense may be held in any of such counties. (v) For any other offense, trial may be ! 
In the county in which the <fefeiui«n# ^MA*** *~ 
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trutioiis Hitler tti.il ittempl t<» in cs till 
ly complete his crime md t> ij i d t t i n 
fion " 
/ 2 2 j I here c in In no txat f IIK iMiie of 
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i < oiifiritmus u i t tgr i ted Mttmpt lv the <lc 
ten i nit and I a)for t o t > «JK dt t t i t i u I v 
t Imun Mine, tht kt) i ) t w i i n i s s t » their iol 
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himstff stated that lilt purpose of t d uu 
the L,irl to the isolated field w IN to j *re \ 11 it 
Jit r from alerting atnfioi ities f< > so m 
i h t use of tht side n» itis »nd tin t J< c^ 
If ii h with tht polite cruise i (viii i (In 
t o l l e i s ' tt II of liiimimnt detttt i n I he 
i n t u i t or fhirt) ininutt p in e if i I u if 
I 't l itvtd toiild h u t hetu uifcipicft I '> 
tht Mil.) I a further nice of the theme 
h\ boosting tlie tour ige of tht rol 11 r«. 
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I 
PEOPLE 
( lleua Culu 
son, J , and the People's appeals were ton 
sohdatcd 1 he Supreme Court Ciro\es 
J , held that statutory provision that no 
criminal Inhility attaches unless check is 
not pan! he cause of insufficient funds ren 
ders statute constitutionally infirm by al 
lowing third pirty drawee hank discretion 
to determine criminal liability by either 
dishonoring or pa>ing check 
Affirmed 
1 Criminal Law <3=al3 1(1) 
Traditional test for vagueness is 
whether statute g i \ t s fair warning of for 
bidden conduct so that men of common in 
telligente tan understand statute's mean 
itig and application 
2 Criminal Law C=>!3 1(2) 
Statutory definition, within pur \ iew of 
statuti proscribing fraud b) check, of ' in 
sufficient funds" that drawer has insuffi 
cient funds with drawee to pay theck whti i 
drawer has no checking account with 
drawee or has funds in checking account 
with d iawee in amount less than amount 
of check plus amount of all other checks 
outstanding is not fatally ambiguous C 
R S 'M 40 5 2<>S(l)(c), ( 2 ) , l a w s 1972 
p 281 [ C K S 7 * IK-S 2 0 5 ( l ) ( e ) . ( 2 ) J 
3 False Pretenses C=>2 
Provision that no criminal liability at 
taches under statute proscribing fraud by 
check unless check is not paid because of 
insufficient funds renders statute consti 
tuttoually infirm b> allowing third part) 
drawee bank discretion to determine crimi 
nal liability by either dishonoring or pay 
mg check ( K b '63, 40 S-20S(2) , l a w s 
1972, p 281 [ C R S 7 3 , 1 8 - S - 2 0 5 ( 2 ) ] 
Doyle 1 Johns, J r , Dist A t t y , Da\ id 
I Roberts Deputy Dist \tt> , I ort Mor 
gan, foi plaintiffs appellants 
Rolhe R Rogers, Colorado State Publit 
Defender, James I« Dumas, J r , Chief 
Deputy State Public Defender, Launi i A 
darner , Dtput) Statt Public Defender 
D c n \ t r , for tic tend nils tppclUes 
J D M it I o l me \ t t ) « icii |e oi I 
Dubofsky Deputy \ t t ) d c u Dcnve i , I d 
ward G Donovan Solicitor d e n D e m e r , 
David K Rces, \ s s t \ t ty (je.ii, inter 
venors 
G R O V I s , Justice 
Defendants Oumn and Reagan were indi 
viduall) charged with fraud by check in 
the same district court, in \ iolat ion of Colo 
S e s s L a w s 1972 eh 4S 4<»- S 2()s
 a t 2S1 
amending C R S |%J |t» S Jiis » 1 ollow 
ing hearings upon defend vnts' motions to 
dismiss m tJeh case before different 
judges the statute was held to be uiitonsti 
tut ional , and the motions wcr< gianted 
The People appeal 1 he eases were con 
solidated here, and we aff irm 
T h e crime of fraud b\ check is dcstrih 
eel as follows 
"Any person who deceit full) issuts a 
check which is not paid because the 
drawer has insufficient funds with the 
drawee issues a fraudulent check nid 
commits fraiiel b) c h e c k " Station Is 
S 2t»s(2>, C K s 1«>, \ 
Insufficient fuiuls is tie fined .is lollows 
"A drawer has insufficn nt fun<ls with the 
drawtee to pay a cheek when the drawer 
has no checking account with the drawee 
or has funds in a e becking account with 
the drawee m an amount less than the 
amount of the check plus the amount of 
all other checks outstanding it the tune 
of issu inte and a check dishoimrtd lor 
no account' shall also be deemed to be 
dishonored for insufficient funds'" 
Sect ion 18-S-3)S( l ><e), C R s |«C^ 
T h e culpable mental state d « acting 
dece i t fu l ly) , which must be proved in order 
to sustain a conviction for ft and !>> thevk 
is defined as fol lows 
"A person deceit full) issues a check 
when, at the time he issues tt he has 
the intent to defraud or deceive a m 
1 3 3 1 <"oio 
o the r pctstni and the rcb ) «>l»t nn-> freiin 
anv oilier person mom \ p r o p e i t ) oi 
o the r th ing of \ a l u e " Sect ion IK *> J»Js 
< l ) (b> . ( R S V)7\ 
Defendan t s arc t ic he re that the statute 
tai ls to m a k e elea*t whe the r the crime is 
comple te at the moment of the I S M I U I U « I 
the check or onl> a f t e r the cheek has In e u 
p resen ted for p i g m e n t and pjxinerU ret t ts 
ed l i u i l i i r they a r g u e lh it the st ttut* 
I ills to m ik< ( l e u whe ther the st ite ot 
the iceoutit it the time of h M i i i i a or it 
the t ime the check is p resen ted tor \> i) 
merit is crit ic tl i his a l leged f u l u i c 
violates due proc< ss I ecause of \ a g u u i e s s 
they i rgue in that a person is un ihie to 
dett rmiiK «t what point in t ime his <.on 
duct becomes mil tw till ami what cuiuliiet 
in fae t is unlaw tul 
1 he second in i jor con ten t ion of tin 
defcnelants is th.il the statute pi lees dis 
e re t ion in th i rd pa r t i e s in eh tc i i i immg 
t i m u n i l h ib iht ) in violation of the du« 
plot ess iit* 1 < mi (I p i o i c i t i o n el ms< s ot (h« 
I OIII ti t n l l l A n i e l l d m e u t t o the I l i l t e d 
M i t e s Cons t i tu t ion I he> i rgue lb it il 
though two persons eould pe r fo rm the s u n t 
identic t! ii t with the s u m ciilpihlc men 
tal st ite one whose e^icck was paid b\ the 
b t n k woulel not be gui l t ) ot the cr ime 
while the one whose check was d i shonored 
would be gui l t \ dete t u n n e d onl> b> tin 
election »t the e l r twce It the check was 
p u d li> the d r i w e e bank a person who <lc 
ce i t l i i lh issued an insuff icient funds check 
could not be convicted of a crime 
549 P A C I F I C R E P O R T E R 2d JbERIES 
I 
We first iddress the issue of \ a g u e u e s s 
In / i . /»/ . / inn 11 177 < olo Ids 4 M 
I ' J d hJ(> (\>72), this cour t in led that ( 
K s l%< l<> 14 3 » ( D ( l u w is
 v ,g„« ,m 
b lguous mil iininte Ihglble It I iscd Its 
i l i i i s ion on (IK l o t (b i t the si mile d c t u 
eel uisuf fa ic nt f u n d s ' to m« m th.it the 
d r a w e i h i s no legal r ight to require the 
di twee to p i ) the cheek in act orelance 
with the o r d i n a r ) eouisc of the bank ing 
business ' I b. « ••-• ' 
this def ini t ion I iisi u found legal r i g h t " 
to le imbiguoiis S t , otiel it fenuid tha t 
the st if nt c did not s p t e i t ) wha t was mean t 
I \ the o rehna i ) course of b a n k i n g bust 
ui ss ' 1 be eoii i t went on to specifically 
ippr AC albeit tu dic ta , the fol lowing dcfi 
ni t ion of uisuf tie lent l u n d s " taken from 
i previous!) \ e t o e d legislat ive act 
*" ^TTfi~iwti h i s insu t l i e i en t funds with 
i d i twee t o t o \ c l i t l l e c k w i n II lie h a s 
no funds t»i account w h i t c v e r , o r funds 
in an amoun t less than that of the c h e c k , 
mel i check d i shonored for no a c c o u n t " 
sh ill ds > be deemed to have been dis 
honen td for uisuf I le le nt funds " ' ' / V o 
/>/t < I in nolo supra 
I b i s coui t then st iteel tli it the a b o \ c defi 
ni t ion spt lis out in tuieJe i s taudablc mean 
ing of insuff icient funds " I he legisla 
l u i i s u b s c e p i e i i t l ) telejptcel the c u r t c t l t e l t f i 
n i t i o i i o f uisuf tie tent f u n d s ' \ compar t 
on of tin (K fniilioii eur re i i t l ) be fenc us 
with (be i in s > previously approved b\ this 
eoiitl elist loses th it the p ies t l i t \ t rsioti is 
ul I 1111 \« I > jhe line ^ the one previous 
Iv t p p i o v e e l 
| 1 2J I he t rad i t ion il test foi \ a g m n e s s 
is win the f a s t a tu te g ives fan w a r n i n g of 
toibiileltu conduct so that men o t common 
intelligence e in u n d e i s t a n d the s ta tu te ' s 
me mine, md ipplie ition Set ( on>uill\ , 
i ,<m/<// ( onstruch n Co JeW l T S W5, 46 
s ( t I Jo 7n 1 I d \22 (\<)2()) J he stat 
ute at bai mee ts th it test A l though we 
i c e o g m / e that the proof may be difficult , 
we find no fatal ambigu i t ) in the stat 
ute in this respect 
II 
(3 J \ It hough the si i tute tloe s not fall 
bee Hist o f \ iglle lie »s it i s i (»!»st it lit M>ll«lll\ 
inf i rm em the o the r g r o u n d prestnteel I In 
<l« r the st tlute no e i mini tl Ii ib ib l ) at 
t i t he s unless the check is not paieJ because 
of uisuf fie ie nt tunels I he de fendan t as 
serfs tli it this t h i n ! p t i t v eliscretion makes 
the statute uncenistitutieni.il W e regard 
/ . / > / « : / out // • * * 
Colo i335 
the buel cheek law reviewed w a s uticonsti 
tu t ional on pieeisel) this g round of th i rd 
p i r t y ehsciet iou I he s ta tute review eel 
there pro\ulc-d tha t a th i rd pa r t ) ( the 
d rawee h a n k ) could determine c r imina l 
l iahili t) by ei ther d i shonor ing or p a ) i n g 
the check '1 he s ta tu te declared unconst t 
tutn>nal there ek i i ued the cr ime as follows 
' \ person is guil ty of issuing a bad 
check when 
' H e u l t e i s a check k n o w i n g or hav ing 
re isouahle e mse to know at the t ime of 
u t t e r i n g it tli it it will not be paid and 
it is not paid bemuse of insufficient 
funds," ( emphas is suppl ied) 
T h e which is not paid " 
l a n g u a g e in the fraud by check statute be 
fore us is virtually the same, thus provid 
ing a th i rd party d rawee bank d iscre t ion 
to d e t e r m i n e criminal liability I he bank ' s 
fn lu re tei honor the check is a ma te r i a l 
e lement of the c r ime ot fr.uid by e heck 
I he holehng in 1'iopli . I tnnola suf>ni, 
w a s 
In addi t ion, under the var ious provi 
s ions of [ the s t a t u t e ] , the act ion of a 
th i rd pa r ty , the bank, can often be the 
factor which de t e rmines whe the r guil t 
a t t a c h e s If two cus tomers each wri te a 
check k n o w i n g it will not be paid on pre 
s en tmen t due to l n su fhc i euc ) of funds 
in the i r respective accounts , each should 
be theoret ical ly guil ty of a c r ime Yet, 
the bank upon which the check is d r a w n 
has the discret ion to d i shonor one and 
pa) the o ther Such a discret ion is a t 
odds with const i tu t ional due process and 
eepial pro tec t ion of the laws ( r iminal 
liability and pun i shments should not be 
p red ica ted upon a t h u d pa r ty ' s un fe t t e red 
d i sc re t ion " 
1 he c u r r e n t s ta tute con ta ins the same 
inf i imi ty in this par t icu la r a s the s ta tute 
in / innola In tha t case, announced M a r c h 
\ \ 1972, we a t tempted to suggest the ele 
m e n t s of a const i tu t ional s ta tu te , but the 
W E I G E L v H A R D E S T Y 
<i te«N c\»l<»Api» 511) I . .1IJ.*. 
Ill p i s s i n g w e l l l \ e i lottet S l t U o l l 1«S S 
*>1J, I l \ S l * / 7 J w h i c h deics neil c o n t a l i 
the cons t i tu t ion ill) i n t i r m language here 
u n d e r consu le ra t ion 
J u d g m e n t a f f i rmed 
Lawrence Waldo WEIGEL, Plaintiff 
Appellant, 
v 
Wlllard B HAROESTY and Mildred Welgel 
Robertson, Defendants-Appellees 
No 75-548 
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\ iu i t J«i I»i7n 
Seleeted for Of fit ml t'iiUh« iitmn 
A divorccel luisbti i i l hioiight .HI action 
a g a i n s t his foiuiei witc AIH\ an a t t o r n e ) , 
c l a im ing tha t a p ro p e r t ) sett lement ag ree 
n ien t had been b reached when the wife re 
corded a qui tc la im dceel to the joint l ) owned 
family res idence wi thout execu t ing a uiott 
g a g e on the residence to the husband s 
b ro ther , a s p romised T h e District Coui t 
\ r a p a h o e C o u n t ) , Wi l l i am 11 Naugle , I 
en te red defau l t j u d g m e n t against the wife 
hut he ld in favor of the a t t o r n e ) , and the 
h u s b a n d appealed The Court of Appeals 
Smi th J , held tha t the evidence supportcel 
the t r i a l cou r t *» conc lus ion that the attorne> 
had representee! the wi fe as much, and not 
as escrow agen t , in the t ransac t ion , ami 
t ha t h e w a s not gui l ty of fraud or mal ice 
in fa i l ing to have the m o r t g a g e executeel 
Aff irmed 
Escrows <8=>l 
Escrow relationship is essentially three 
